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At approximately 0200 hours on Saturday, 5 August 1944, a strange 
bugle sound resounded in one of the 
compounds of prisoners of war (POW) 
Camp No.12 in Cowra, Australia. Almost 
immediately, more than 900 Japanese 
prisoners of war rushed from their 
living quarters, which they had set on 
fire, and ran for the barbed wire fences. 
Most of them were armed with an assortment 
of hand-made weapons, which ranged from 
improvised bats and clubs studded with nails 
to crude swords fashioned from dismantled 
bread-cutters and knives stolen from kitchens 
and mess halls. Using gloves and pieces of cloth 
to protect their hands and bodies, the inmates 
climbed over the fences with the help of ropes 
that they had manufactured from rice sacks. 
Blankets and towels were then thrown over the 
wires to facilitate the cross over. Despite the use 
of their rifles and machine guns, the Australians 
were incapable of stopping the Japanese and 
hundreds broke through the camp’s wire system. 
At daybreak, search parties began rounding up 
the escapees. All 378 of them were recaptured 
in the days that followed the incident. In the 
end, 234 Japanese prisoners of war were killed 
and 108 were wounded. Four Australian guards 
were killed, two of them posthumously awarded 
the George Cross for outstanding gallantry and 
devotion to duty, and four others suffered severe 
wounds. An Australian military court of inquiry 
concluded several weeks later that the Cowra 
mass escape attempt had been premeditated 
and that the objective of the prisoners 
was to overthrow the camp and commit 
mass suicide.1  
German POWs planned a similar mass 
escape in Canada. This little-known 
incident is almost completely ignored 
in the historiography. In early October 
1944, Canadian intelligence officers at 
POW Camp No.44 Grande Ligne, in southern 
Quebec, learned that a secret organization known 
as the HARIKARI Club had been created by some 
of the camp’s more ardent Nazi sympathizers. 
Their goal was to prepare a suicidal mass escape 
that promised to wreak havoc on the region 
surrounding the camp. They sought to break 
free in order to slaughter as many Canadians 
and inflict as much sabotage and destruction as 
possible before being killed. This rampage was 
to be launched as soon as the Nazi prisoners 
regarded the war as absolutely lost or in the 
event of Germany’s unconditional surrender. 
Taking the threat very seriously, the camp staff 
began preparing for the worst. Reinforcements 
were brought in, requests were made for new 
weapons and equipment, the camp’s wire system 
was strengthened, defensive positions were built 
in the vicinity of the camp, and precautionary 
plans were devised to neutralize the inmates in 
the event they launched their suicidal attack. 
Although the HARIKARI Club was dismantled 
several months later and the dreaded mass 
escape attempt never occurred, this incident 
proved how Nazism remained a powerful force 
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in Canadian POW camps in the last months of 
the Second World War. It also showed how well 
German POWs were organized behind Canadian 
barbed wire. This article will examine the rise 
of the HARIKARI Club and the measures taken 
by Canadian military authorities to counter the 
threat it posed. 
POW Camp No.44 was located in the small 
village of Grande Ligne near Napierville in 
southern Quebec, less than 50 kilometers away 
from Montreal and close to the United States 
border. It was part of a complex network of 
internment facilities located across Canada 
where approximately 34,000 German POW 
were detained during the Second World War.2  
Its origins date from early September 1942 
when officials from the Department of National 
Defence (DND) Directorate of Prisoners of 
War, investigated the possibility of building an 
internment camp in Quebec specifically suited 
for German POW officers.3  According to the 1929 
Geneva Convention, captured enemy officers 
were to be segregated from non-commissioned 
officers and other ranks, and were to be treated 
with due regard to their rank and age.4  This 
implied that special facilities had to be created 
by all belligerents for the incarceration of POW 
officers. At the time, Canada operated two such 
camps in Ontario: No.20 in Gravenhurst and 
No.30 in Bowmanville. Because these internment 
facilities became increasingly overcrowded, the 
construction of a new POW officer camp became 
necessary.5  
 Representatives from Military District 4 
(M.D.4) headquarters in Montreal, which was 
in charge of internment operations in Quebec, 
were given the difficult task of finding a suitable 
location for this new POW officer camp. Several 
properties were considered, including two hotel 
complexes in the Laurentians and a Golf Club at 
Beaconsfield.6  M.D.4 officials also inquired into 
the possibility of using the Grande Ligne Mission’s 
Feller Institute premises, which then served as 
a residential school for young men. It consisted 
of a U-shaped four-story stone building, a brick 
gymnasium, eight frame houses, a large barn, and 
numerous smaller buildings with approximately 
240 acres of land.7  M.D.4 found the site suitable, 
and negotiations were immediately undertaken 
between the Privy Council Office and the Grande 
Ligne Mission. An agreement ensued on 24 
November 1942 whereby the Mission agreed to 
lease its property to the Canadian government 
for the sum of $15,000 per year.8  
M.D.4 headquarters took over the site on 15 
January 1943 and immediately began converting 
it into a proper internment facility.9  It took nearly 
five months to build the camp. Wire fences 
and guard towers were erected and existing 
buildings were renovated under difficult winter 
conditions. But when Swiss representatives 
inspected the completed camp on behalf of the 
German authorities on 16 June 1943, they found 
the installations to be highly satisfactory.10  As 
the Consul General of Switzerland in Canada 
reported: 
I was deeply impressed by the work undertaken 
in order to adapt perfectly the existing buildings 
and annexes to the new purpose. I think that, 
in spite of the natural difficulties due to the 
very hard winter and conditions prevailing in 
Prisoner of War Camp 
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wartime, the Canadian authorities have done 
splendid work on this place and I have no 
doubt that the new camp will be on the same 
level, in the way of comfort and facilities, as the 
Bowmanville officers’ camp, which is universally 
regarded as being an outstanding place of 
internment.11 
 After receiving this vote of confidence, within 
the next week, Lieutenant-Colonel Eric D.B. 
Kippen (camp commandant) and his staff of 
approximately 250 guardsmen from the Veterans’ 
Guard of Canada (VGC) prepared for the coming 
of the German prisoners.12 
 The camp opened on 28 June 1943 with 
the arrival of 467 Germans who had been 
temporarily transferred to POW Camp No.40 
Farnham, Quebec, in early December 1942 
because of severe overcrowding at Bowmanville 
and Gravenhurst. Most of them were Luftwaffe 
pilots and aircrew shot down during the Battle of 
Britain and Kriegsmarine seamen captured on 
naval operations in the Atlantic Ocean and the 
North Sea.13  Between July 1943 and February 
1944, approximately 250 additional German 
POW were sent to Grande Ligne; many had been 
captured in North Africa and Italy.14  By early 
October 1944, when camp authorities learned 
of the HARIKARI Club scheme, the total POW 
population in the camp numbered 713.15  
 Nazism proved extremely popular at Grande 
Ligne. German POW officers, especially the 
younger ones who had been subject to years 
of exposure to Nazi propaganda, expressed a 
strong sense of loyalty to Adolf Hitler and the 
Nazi regime. Even in captivity, they continued 
to display great pride in the military strength 
and conquests of the Third Reich. Because they 
believed Canada would someday be invaded by 
German armed forces and become a colony of 
Nazi Germany, many German officers worked 
to keep the Nazi spirit alive inside the camp. 
Canadian authorities perceived this as a serious 
problem. Of particular concern was the fact that 
Nazi sympathizers, aside from being arrogant 
and defiant, had a tendency to be extremely 
aggressive, especially against prisoners who 
expressed anti-Nazi sentiments. They were also 
very well organized. They had their own Gestapo, 
propaganda, and intelligence sections as well as 
an escape committee, all of which operated in 
utmost secrecy.16  
 The Gestapo section had the task of making 
sure that Nazism remained the dominant force 
inside the camp’s enclosure. This was done 
through acts of intimidation and violence. 
Members of the camp Gestapo spied on fellow 
inmates and used strong-arm methods to 
alienate and terrorize anti-Nazis. Prisoners who 
cooperated with the Canadian authorities were 
often subjected to kangaroo courts, where they 
were judged as ‘traitors’ and usually beaten. The 
Gestapo section also gathered an impressive 
arsenal of clubs, knives, and other hand-made 
weapons. Beatings, death threats, and other 
acts of brutality usually occurred at night and 
in remote parts of the camp so as to prevent 
detection by the guards. Victims occasionally 
had to be segregated from the rest of the inmate 
population by camp authorities and held in 
protective custody. So successful were the actions 
of the camp Gestapo that very few prisoners dared 
openly to express their anti-Nazi sentiments.17  
 The propaganda section’s mission was 
to educate fellow prisoners along Nazi lines. 
Its members organized Nazi celebrations and 
fabricated and distributed Nazi regalia and 
literature. They also administered an impressive 
Nazi training program known as NAPOLA (Nazi 
Political Learning), whose purpose was to keep 
POW officers as well trained and thoroughly 
indoctrinated as possible. Emphasis was 
placed on the maintenance of a strong German 
sentiment, the dissemination of Nazi doctrines, 
and the fostering of martial attitudes. NAPOLA 
training consisted of a series of secret lectures 
and seminars on topics such as Nazism, German 
history, political geography, military science, 
intelligence, map reading, and battlefield 
leadership. It not only permitted German officers 
to reaffirm their commitment to the Nazi cause, 
it also gave them an opportunity to test their 
military skills and knowledge of war.18  
 The purpose of the intelligence section was 
to obtain vital information on the progression 
of the war overseas, the military efforts of the 
Allied powers, the state of the Canadian home 
front, and the condition of German POWs in 
Canada. Data was collected through a variety 
of means, the most important being a secret 
hand-made radio receiver built from tin cans, 
pieces of wire, aluminum foil, and the amplifier 
of a record player.19  It allowed members of the 
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Intelligence section to listen to American, British, 
Canadian, and even German radio broadcasts 
and to remain abreast of international events. 
The inmates also attempted on several occasions 
to use the camp mail system to transmit valuable 
information to Nazi Germany. To avoid detection 
by Canadian censors, letters were encoded or 
written in various types of ‘invisible inks’ made 
from milk, oranges, potatoes, urine, and other 
natural products.20  Furthermore, the intelligence 
section kept detailed records of the movements of 
camp guards and the number of trains arriving 
at the local railway station.21 
 The goal of the escape committee, as the 
name indicates, was to plan escapes. German 
POWs saw it as their military duty to try to break 
free and return to Germany. They knew that 
preventing getaways was a tiresome enterprise for 
camp guards, who constantly had to be alert and 
vigilant, and that it forced detaining powers to 
deploy more men for the protection of internment 
camps. Members of the committee built tunnels, 
impersonated VGC guards, and helped fellow 
prisoners break away by jumping over fences 
or cutting through them.22  To facilitate such 
endeavors, they fabricated tools and gathered 
all sorts of evasion materials, some of which 
arrived in the camp hidden in German Red Cross 
parcels. These included, for example, complete 
VGC uniforms with wedge caps and badges made 
of tin; camouflage suits and civilian clothing 
made from blankets; hand-made sandbags; 
wire cutters, compasses, saws, and other tools; 
daggers; falsified documents of American, 
Argentine, British, Canadian, Dutch, Latvian, 
and other origins; diagrams for assembling 
radio transmitters; code books; escape diaries; 
Canadian currency; as well as maps of eastern 
Canada and the United States. Camp authorities 
even found charts of American and Canadian 
airports and the detailed plan of a Douglas DC 
3 transport aircraft during an extensive search 
of the POW compound in September 1944.23  
 The escape committee also worked in 
close cooperation with the intelligence section. 
Understanding how virtually impossible it was 
for German POW to break free successfully from 
North American internment camps and return to 
Europe, members of the committee deliberately 
planned and coordinated escapes to provide 
the intelligence section with useful data on the 
Canadian home front and the area surrounding 
the camp. Acting as spies, escapees were to be 
on the lookout for bridges, factories, railways, 
airfields, and other sites important to the 
Canadian war effort. This information was then 
transmitted to the intelligence section following 
recapture.24  
German prisoners of war arrive at the train station in Quebec City, July 1940. This group primarily
contains German officers from the Kriegsmarine (navy), Luftwaffe (air force) and Heer (army).
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 The first escapee to be used as a spy was 
Korvettenkapitän (Commander) Hugo Foerester. 
The incident occurred at Camp Farnham on 28 
June 1943, several hours before the transfer of 
the camp’s POW population to Grande Ligne.25  
Before being recaptured by the Quebec Provincial 
Police the next day, Foerester was able to carry out 
a reconnaissance of Dorval airport in Montreal. 
Upon his arrival at Grande Ligne, Foerester 
immediately reported his findings to members 
of the Intelligence section.26  Another successful 
attempt occurred on 13 September 1944 when 
Oberleutnant (Lieutenant) Gerhard Wanckel 
escaped from Grande Ligne and reached the 
United States by walking along the Richelieu 
River. He was caught the next day near Rouses 
Point, New York after having conducted a 
reconnaissance of the region. Wanckel’s recapture 
provided the intelligence section with additional 
data.27  
 So serious became the issue of Nazism at 
Grande Ligne and several other POW camps 
that, in the summer of 1944, the Directorate of 
Prisoners of War felt compelled to completely 
reorganize the Canadian internment operation in 
order to segregate Nazi inmates from anti-Nazis. 
For this purpose, on 5 August 1944, the Canadian 
Psychological Warfare Committee introduced 
a special POW classification system known as 
PHERUDA.28  In conformity with this new scheme, 
German prisoners were interrogated by camp 
intelligence officers and Military Intelligence 7 
(M.I.7) agents and classed in three categories: 
‘Black’ (pro-Nazis), ‘Grey’ (no strong political 
convictions) and ‘White’ (anti-Nazis). Each 
Canadian POW camp was assigned a specific 
group of prisoners. Because of the already well-
established popularity of Nazism at Grande 
Ligne, that camp was chosen for the incarceration 
of ‘Black’ prisoners.29  
 Nothing reflected more on the dominance of 
Nazism at Grande Ligne than the establishment 
of the HARIKARI Club. The D-Day landings of 
6 June 1944 had a tremendous impact on the 
POWs. The realization that Allied military forces 
might soon crush Nazi Germany, combined with 
feelings of anger and uselessness, incited the 
Nazis to become more ruthless and rabid.30  The 
HARIKARI Club was created in the early summer 
of 1944 by some of these POW as a means of 
continuing the war behind Canadian barbed 
wire. Although not much is known about the 
roots of this secret organization, we do know 
that it operated under the chairmanship of three 
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senior Nazi officers: Oberstleutnant (Lieutenant-
Colonel) Guenther Schemmel, Major (Major) E.C. 
Von Schnorr, and Hauptmann (Captain) Rudolf 
Moellerfriedrich.31  As reported by Colonel W.W. 
Murray (Director of Military Intelligence), the aim 
of the plot was the following: 
The HARIKARI Club…is based on the old 
German ‘Twilight of the Gods’ (Gotterdaem-
erung) philosophy-mythology, wherein the Gods 
kill off each other in a final orgy of violence. 
The HARIKARI plan will go into operation when 
it becomes obvious that the capitulation or 
destruction of the German Army is imminent 
and a negotiated peace is beyond hope. When 
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the right moment is decided on by the HARIKARI 
leaders, members will proceed to murder all 
fellow POW whom they consider to be ‘cowards’ 
because of their anti-Nazi sentiments. The 
HARIKARI POW will then rush some or all of the 
guard towers, regardless of cost to themselves, 
and break out of the enclosure. Some will 
proceed to murder as many of the Camp Staff 
as possible. In this connection, the Camp 
Commandant, Camp Intelligence Officer and 
Camp Sergeant-Major have been singled out for 
special attention at Grande Ligne. Others will 
head for the nearest plants, industrial areas, 
airports, etc., to commit as much damage and 
sabotage as possible. Their final aim is as much 
murder and destruction as possible before they 
themselves are killed. It must be realized that 
the POW officers involved in the HARIKARI Club 
are fully aware that a number of innocent people 
will be killed and that most or all of them will 
be killed. Nevertheless, their Nazi minds are so 
transfixed by the Gotterdaemerung idea that 
their only thought is to go to their deaths in a 
final blaze of glory, taking as many of the enemy, 
and as much of his property, as possible with 
them to destruction.32 
 Camp authorities learned of the HARIKARI 
Club on 3 October 1944. In a letter addressed 
to camp intelligence officers, German civilian 
internee Georg Felber, the camp’s Roman 
Catholic priest, informed camp officials about 
the existence of this secret Nazi organization. 
For several months, Felber and his Catholic 
followers had been persecuted by anti-Christian 
Nazi sympathizers, which included several 
members of this so-called HARIKARI Club. Tired 
of the harassment and fearing for his life, Felber 
decided to tell the Canadian authorities about 
the ‘Black’ prisoners’ clandestine activities. In 
his letter, he warned the camp staff of the true 
purpose of the HARIKARI Club, which was the 
preparation of a suicidal mass escape attempt 
that was to be launched as soon as the Nazi 
POWs regarded the war as absolutely lost, which 
Felber expected to be very soon.33  He, therefore, 
requested the immediate dismantlement of 
the HARIKARI Club, emphasizing that “it must 
be done with extreme care and skill, because 
otherwise the HARIKARI Club would begin the 
attack.” His solution was to close the camp 
altogether and divide the prisoner population by 
transferring it to different internment facilities. 
Felber also gave the Canadian authorities a list of 
the ringleaders and other dangerous prisoners. 
It included some 100 names.34  
 The revelations concerning the HARIKARI 
Club took camp authorities by surprise. Although 
VGC guards had been aware for several months 
that the inmates were preparing something, 
they had no idea what it was. As a Canadian 
intelligence officer admitted after learning of the 
existence of the HARIKARI Club: 
We have been aware for some months of the 
aggressiveness of Nazi officers in Camp No.44. 
The fact that they have an Intelligence section, 
which has obtained a mass of information on 
railroads, bridges, and airports in the Montreal 
area and upper New York State, has been known 
for some time. Also, that an escaped POW officer 
carried out a reconnaissance of Dorval airport 
and reported back to camp intelligence is past 
history.35
Nobody, however, expected that the prisoners 
might use this information for the preparation of a 
suicidal mass escape plot. As camp commandant 
Kippen noted, the existence of the HARIKARI 
Club “indicates a new line of action by the POW 
and is a result of the lost German cause.”36  Had 
it not been for Felber, camp authorities might 
never have learned about the existence of the 
HARIKARI Club. 
 Almost immediately, camp officials began 
preparing for the worst. On 4 October, Kippen sent 
a copy of Felber’s letter to M.D.4 headquarters 
and the Directorate of Prisoners of War. He also 
warned the entire camp staff of the possible 
danger of a HARIKARI Club attack and made 
arrangements to strengthen security inside the 
camp. At the time, 12 officers and 270 guards 
from No.40 Company VGC were stationed 
at Grande Ligne.37  A change of command 
was instituted the next day with Lieutenant-
Colonel H.W. Hiltz replacing Kippen as camp 
commandant, a decision that had been lingering 
since 20 September and had supposedly nothing 
to do with the HARIKARI Club affair.38  
 To confirm the authenticity of Felber’s story, 
a ‘White’ German Army Oberstleutnant named 
Alois Frank was interrogated on 12 October 1944 
while in Montreal for an eye treatment. A staunch 
anti-Nazi, Frank assured camp officials that “the 
HARIKARI Club is authentic” and that it was “more 
serious than realized.” He gave a detailed account 
of the Nazi organization’s aims and provided a 
list of some of its targets, which included the 
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munitions dumps at l’Acadie and the St. Jean 
airport, where the British Commonwealth Air 
Training Plan (B.C.A.T.P.) No.9 Air Observation 
School was located and where a great number 
of military aircraft were concentrated. Both 
sites were situated approximately ten kilometers 
from the camp. Frank also confirmed the 
camp authorities’ suspicions that the German 
POW operated a secret hand-made radio 
receiver. Canadian authorities perceived this 
as a serious problem since it meant that the 
inmates could know the exact date of Germany’s 
capitulation and at this point initiate their own 
Gotterdaemerung. Frank then furnished camp 
officials with a list of HARIKARI Club members. 
It was fairly identical to that provided by Felber 
and registered approximately 100 names. Frank 
explained that as a former Bavarian police 
prefect, he knew many of the prisoners on that list 
prior to the outbreak of the war and was aware 
of their Nazi antecedents. To avoid bloodshed 
and destruction, he recommended the removal 
of these bad elements from the camp as soon 
as possible.39  Because of his determination to 
help camp authorities eradicate the HARIKARI 
Club, Frank refused the offer to be sent to 
another internment camp. In his opinion, “there 
was much more work for him to do within the 
enclosure” as an informant “so that the camp 
staff can be advised of the latest information and 
also of any matter which may be considered of 
great urgency.“ Felber, on the other hand, was 
transferred to the camp at Farnham later that 
month.40  
 The HARIKARI Club affair was taken very 
seriously at DND. The incident that occurred two 
months earlier at Cowra in Australia had shown 
the level of devastation that could result from a 
suicidal mass escape attempt. National Defence 
Headquarters officials in Ottawa understood 
the destructive impact that a similar endeavor 
could have on the Canadian home front. The 
proximity of Grande Ligne to Montreal and 
other urban centers, where important industrial 
plants, shipyards, military installations, and 
transport establishments (dockyards, railways, 
airports, etc.) were located, made the HARIKARI 
German prisoners of  war relax in a reading lounge at Camp Grande Ligne.
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Club scheme all the more threatening. Attacks 
against such facilities could seriously affect the 
Canadian war effort and cause heavy losses of life. 
Precautionary measures were therefore urgently 
required to protect the region and its population. 
Several days after the interrogation of Alois 
Frank, representatives from the Directorates 
of  Prisoners of War, Military intelligence, and 
Veterans’ Guard of Canada began investigating 
the HARIKARI Club situation. All of them were 
concerned with security arrangements in the 
camp, the greatest worry being how to combat a 
HARIKARI Club attack should it ever happen. 
 The Directorate of Prisoners of War was 
particularly interested in the level of readiness 
of the camp staff. On 17 October 1944, 
Lieutenant-Colonel H.W. Pearson was sent to 
M.D.4 headquarters in Montreal to discuss the 
Grande Ligne prisoners’ mass escape scheme and 
oversee some of the measures taken to protect 
the camp. That same day, Pearson accompanied 
several M.D.4 and M.I.7 officers on a visit to the 
camp. The commandant, Hiltz, then informed 
him that “he was quite able to meet any situation 
that might arise so long as present conditions 
were unchanged” but that “he might need 
additional guard troops as a reserve in the event 
of insubordination.” In his report to Colonel H.N. 
Streight (Director of Prisoners of War), Pearson 
concluded that such a mass suicide effort was 
quite possible and that reinforcements should 
be ready in the advent of trouble.41  Streight 
complied with Pearson’s request and authorized 
the immediate mobilization of a reserve force 
of three platoons from No.10 Company, VGC 
stationed at Camp Farnham. These troops were to 
be placed at the disposal of M.D.4 headquarters. 
Streight felt very confident in the VGC’s ability 
to cope with a possible mass escape attempt. He 
also believed that the surrounding landscape 
would be of advantage to the guardsmen. “The 
country adjacent to the camp is open, flat farm 
land where concealment is quite difficult,” he 
emphasized. “Past experience has shown that 
recapture becomes very much more difficult if 
escaped POW can take concealment in densely 
wooded areas.”42  
 The Directorate of Military Intelligence, on the 
other hand, was more concerned. On 17 October, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Eric Acland held several 
telephone conversations about the HARIKARI 
Club with M.I.7 and camp intelligence officers 
as well as former camp commandant Kippen. 
Based on the information he received, Acland 
concluded in a report that such a mass suicide 
effort was quite possible and that, should it 
occur, “a considerable number of German POW 
officers will be shot with perhaps unfortunate 
repercussions on our own POW in Germany; 
some of the camp staff will be killed; and some 
of the Nazis will succeed in breaking out and in 
reaching vulnerable objectives such as the Dorval 
and St. Hubert air fields.” Because of the camp’s 
proximity to Montreal, Acland suggested that 
Grande Ligne no longer be used for the detention 
of ‘Blacks’ and that HARIKARI Club members be 
immediately transferred. As he explained: 
The danger of continuing to allow the present 
rabid clique of Nazi officers to remain at Grande 
Ligne becomes increasingly more apparent…It 
must be considered that any ‘Black’ officer camp 
will be a first rate security problem and therefore 
the locating of such a camp near a metropolitan 
area or communications center, as is the case 
of Grande Ligne…is not concurred in from the 
security aspect.43 
 Anxious to discuss the possibility of moving 
the camp’s ‘Blacks’ to a new ‘Black’ officer camp, 
Acland arranged an M.I.7 meeting on 20 October, 
which was attended by Lieutenant-Colonel 
Pearson of the Directorate of Prisoners of War. 
Most intelligence officers agreed with Acland’s 
proposal. They even provided a list of potential 
internment camps to replace Grande Ligne: 
No.33, Petawawa; No.101, Angler, Ontario; No.70, 
Fredericton, New Brunswick; and No.130, Seebee 
(formerly Kananaskis), Alberta. Pearson, on the 
other hand, emphasized that the segregation of 
the POWs was the responsibility of the Chiefs of 
the General Staff and “it therefore follows that the 
General Staff should recommend or suggest the 
camp which should be used, keeping in mind, in 
view of the situation in Camp No.44, security of 
industry and Army and Air establishments within 
a reasonable area of the internment camp.”44  
Colonel Streight concurred with this view. “The 
question of establishing a ‘Black’ camp for officer 
POW,” he explained, “is one that should not be 
hastily answered. Up to the present, attempts 
towards segregation have accomplished little of a 
constructive nature and have added substantially 
to the confusion and unrest amongst POW. It is 
my opinion that the number of POW to be found 
in Camp No.44 who are not either ‘Black’ or ‘Dark 
Grey’ is almost negligible.”45 
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 The Directorate Veterans’ Guard of Canada 
was preoccupied with the protection of VGC 
personnel. Following a visit to M.D.4 headquarters 
and Camp Grande Ligne on 19 October, Colonel 
C.P. Lavigne (Assistant Adjutant-General, 
Directorate Veteran’s Guard of Canada), sent a 
memorandum to Colonel J.M. Taylor (Director 
Veterans’ Guard of Canada) in which he suggested 
that the VGC guardsmen be completely re-
equipped. Among the items requested were a 
wheeled armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) and a 
universal carrier. As he explained: “The A.F.V. 
could be used inside the camp’s enclosure while 
the universal carrier would be useful to follow 
escapees over fields.” Lavigne also recommended 
that the camp be provided with six Vickers heavy 
machine guns, seven portable No.58 radio sets, a 
supply of tear gas, grenades, plus a good quantity 
of parachute flares and pistol grip lights to be 
used in the event of an electrical breakdown. 
He also requested that the British Mk-II steel 
helmets issued to camp guards be replaced with 
the American M-1, which could “afford greater 
protection against clubs, stones, etc.”46  Taylor, 
however, refused most of the items recommended 
by Lavigne: 
It is respectfully suggested that the POW 
personnel of this camp remain as at present, 
and in addition to, or in place of Vickers machine 
guns…which the VGC are not trained in the use 
of, that sufficient Reising sub-machine guns 
be made available to place two in each tower 
instead of one as at present. That tear gas be not 
supplied, but instead fire hose might be used to 
rout the POW out of buildings. That an adequate 
supply of flash and pistol grip lights be kept 
on hand; and that a supply of wood clubs, say 
from 2 to 2½ feet in length, be on hand for close 
combat skirmishing, inside buildings, where it 
is not possible to use bayonets.47  
 Evidently, Taylor was not as apprehensive 
of the HARIKARI Club as Lavigne and seemed 
to believe that a suicidal attack could be quelled 
in the same manner and with the same tools 
and weapons as the Bowmanville Riot on 10-12 
October 1942, the only serious POW revolt in 
a Canadian internment camp during the war. 
Taylor, then commandant of Camp Bowmanville, 
suppressed the riot with the help of 400 Canadian 
soldiers armed only with unloaded rifles with 
fixed bayonets, hardwood clubs, and high-
pressure fire hoses. Approximately 80 Germans 
and 20 Canadians suffered injuries during the 
so-called “Battle of Bowmanville.” Interestingly, 
many of the ringleaders were transferred to 
Farnham in early December 1942 and then to 
Grande Ligne a few months later.48  In the end, 
Taylor’s comments did not prevent the arrival at 
Grande Ligne in late October of No.69 grenades, 
tear gas generators, Bren light machine guns, as 
well as other supplies.49  
 It late November, military authorities turned 
their attention to the protection of the region 
and its civilian population, and informed the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) about 
the existence of the HARIKARI Club. The threat 
of sabotage to essential home front installations 
and the possible danger to civil life and property 
was taken very seriously by the RCMP On 29 
November, Deputy Commissioner F.J. Mead went 
to Montreal to discuss the HARIKARI Club threat 
with M.D.4 officials. Meeting with Major-General 
E.J. Renaud (District Officer Commanding 
M.D.4) and camp commandant Hiltz, he became 
impressed with the seriousness of the situation 
and expressed great concern with the danger of 
sabotage to the important electric power plants 
at Cèdres and Beauharnois. In the end, all agreed 
that something serious might soon happen and 
that measures needed to be immediately taken 
to counter the threat.50  Deputy Commissioner 
Mead then visited ‘C’ Division headquarters, 
RCMP in Montreal, where he met with Glen 
Bethel of the United States Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), Commissioner S.T. Wood, 
and other members of the RCMP. They agreed that 
there would be the fullest cooperation between 
the RCMP and M.D.4 authorities and to prepare 
precautionary plans. Deputy Commissioner F.J. 
Harvison of ‘C’ Division, RCMP, was sent the next 
morning to M.D.4 headquarters to work with 
Renaud and his officers to prepare detailed plans 
and operational orders to be issued as quickly 
as possible.51  In the meantime, RCMP and M.D.4 
officials recommended, as a precautionary 
measure, that additional VGC troops be based in 
the region. Two platoons from No.12 Company, 
VGC, originally stationed at POW Camp No.23 
Monteith, Ontario, arrived as reinforcements 
at St. Jean, Quebec, in the late afternoon of 1 
December. Their task was to protect the civilians 
living in the vicinity of the camp in the event of a 
possible breakout.52  
 Although urgent requests to segregate 
the camp compound had been issued by the 
Directorate of Military Intelligence and Camp 
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Grande Ligne officers, higher authorities 
remained hesitant. The reason was that no one 
understood if POWs in other camps knew of the 
HARIKARI Club’s existence or if similar Nazi 
organizations had been established in other 
internment centers. There was the dual possibility 
that transferring HARIKARI Club leaders might 
provoke the other ‘Black’ prisoners to initiate 
the suicide process or trigger the rise of similar 
groups in other camps.53  The situation began 
to change on 1 December, when Major-General 
Renaud urged DND to move all ‘Blacks’ out of the 
district and recommended that another camp be 
chosen for the incarceration of such prisoners. 
His argument was that ‘Black’ internment 
camps should not be located near urbanized, 
industrialized, and densely populated areas, as 
was the case with Grande Ligne. Instead, they 
should be established in isolated regions as far 
removed as possible from vulnerable points. His 
reasons: 
(A) The density of the civil population in the 
neighboring area; (B) The proximity of Grande 
Ligne to Montreal District where a considerable 
number of factories are employed on war work; 
(C) The easy access to power plants such as 
Beauharnois, Cèdres, Black River and even 
Shawinigan, the damage of which would cause 
great harm to the war effort; (D) The number 
of airports in the neighborhood – St. Jean, St. 
Hubert, Dorval; (E) The proximity to ammunition 
dumps at L’Acadie and Delson; (F) The difficulty 
of providing immediate trained reinforcements 
due to lack of troops in the vicinity. This is 
particularly so in the winter months when roads 
to Grande Ligne may become snowbound. 54  
 Although Renaud emphasized that all 
possible precautionary measures had already 
been taken and that the situation was well in 
hand, he did warn about the rapidity with which 
a HARIKARI Club attack might occur and the 
difficulties which might be encountered by VGC 
troops if such a scenario ever happened. He 
was particularly concerned with the older age of 
VGC guards as well as their poor equipment.55  
General A.G.L. McNaughton (Minister of National 
Defence) was immediately made aware of the 
necessity to transfer the ‘Black’ prisoners. 
 On the morning of 2 December, McNaughton 
discussed the HARIKARI Club threat with top 
rank DND and RCMP officials. He noted that 
Louis St. Laurent (Minister of Justice) had been 
briefed on the HARIKARI Club by the RCMP 
and was particularly concerned with the serious 
implications of a possible ‘break out’ at Grande 
Ligne. McNaughton made it abundantly clear 
that the fullest cooperation should continue 
between military authorities and the RCMP, 
which was responsible for the protection of 
civilians.56  An arrangement was formalized with 
Commissioner Wood, whereby the RCMP agreed 
to supply a liaison officer to DND to enhance 
cooperation.57  Their greatest concern, however, 
was the question of transferring approximately 
100 ‘Black’ HARIKARI Club members to another 
suitable ‘Black’ camp. After much discussion, 
McNaughton ordered that “an absolute secure 
prisoner of war camp be prepared at once to 
hold from 200 to 250 officers, so that it can be 
used if it is decided to remove the leaders from 
Grande Ligne” and also that “full standards of 
accommodation for officers under the Geneva 
Convention be observed in order to prevent 
reprisals in Germany.”58  
 Although it was pointed out that there 
was no vacant camp immediately available, all 
agreed that the most suitable camp was located 
at Seebee, Alberta. The advantage with this 
internment facility was that it was fairly isolated 
in the Rocky Mountains and far from major 
urban centers or military installations. Escapes 
would, therefore, be of almost no threat to the 
security of the home front. It was proposed for 
such reasons to use Seebee as a ‘Super Black’ 
camp for the accommodation of ‘Black’ German 
officers from all of Canada’s POW camps. The 
problem then became where to transfer the 460 
German officers and 156 other ranks currently 
interned at Seebee. After much discussion, it 
was decided that the most practical solution, 
with the necessary requirements of security and 
speed, was the conversion of the then vacant 
army training center at Wainright, Alberta, 
which could be used as a POW camp to hold 
approximately 700 officers and 200 other ranks. 
The drawback was that it would take between six 
weeks and two months to make the Wainright 
facilities sufficiently secure. In the end, it was 
agreed to obtain the concurrence of the general 
staff as to the availability of the Wainright 
training center, to make arrangements with the 
Quartermaster-General for construction and 
plans for the conversion, and to immediately 
select a commanding officer and the personnel 
required for the proper administration and 
security of this new camp. In the meantime, it 
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was decided to keep the eventual transfer of the 
‘Black’ inmates a secret.59  
 On 4 December, the Chiefs of the General 
Staff discussed the transfer of HARIKARI Club 
members to Seebee. Lieutenant-General J.C. 
Murchie (Chief of the General Staff) “directed that 
the hutted accommodation at Wainright would be 
made immediately available as accommodation 
for POW removed from Seebee so that in turn 
the latter could be used to hold officer POW 
removed from Grande Ligne.” He emphasized 
that the transfer of the ‘Black’ inmates would have 
to wait until the construction of the new camp, 
designated No.135, at Wainright was complete. 
Only at that time would Grande Ligne no longer 
be used for the internment of ‘Blacks.’60  It was 
now only a matter of time before Canadian 
authorities could attempt to dismantle the 
HARIKARI Club. 
 In the meantime, M.D.4 completed the 
strengthening of the camp’s security system, 
which had begun a month 
earlier. Guard towers were 
re in forced ,  addi t iona l 
firearms were supplied, a 
plentiful quantity of pistol-
grip spotlights and ground 
f lares  were furnished, 
additional f lood lights, 
searchlights and other 
lighting equipment were 
installed, new barbed wire 
entanglements were erected, 
and six machine gun posts 
were established at strategic 
points around the camp with 
weapons facing towards the 
enclosure.61  Additional VGC 
troops, “to the limit of the 
capacity of the barracks,” 
were stationed in the camp. 
Reserve VGC forces were 
also standing by at St. Jean 
and Farnham. According to 
operational orders devised 
by M.D.4 and the RCMP, these troops were to 
form a ‘recapture screen’ around the camp area 
in the advent of a mass escape. They were to 
protect all bridges and railway stations leading 
to Montreal and intercept all civilian traffic on 
nearby roads. An agreement was even made 
with the Canadian National Railway (CNR) and 
Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) to permit VGC 
troops to examine all freight trains passing 
through the region. Men from these units 
were also to protect vital industrial plants as 
well as the Beauharnois and Cèdres electric 
powerhouses, where “considerable sabotage 
could be carried out without explosives and other 
sabotage equipment.” Damage to these two power 
plants, it was believed, “would seriously affect 
all industries in the Montreal area” and cause 
delays in war production. It is important to note 
that VGC guardsmen were to be assisted in their 
duties around the region by RCMP personnel. 
Arrangements were also made with the BCATP 
No.9 Air Observation School at St. Jean for 
military aircraft, which were to be used for aerial 
General A.G.L. McNaughton, 
minister of national defence, was 
quite concerned about the possible 
actions of the “HARIKARI club” 
and ordered that all necessary 
steps be taken to prevent it from 
happening.
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reconnaissance and for observing the movements 
of escapees. The Quebec Provincial Police, the 
New York and Vermont State Police, the FBI, and 
the United States Border Patrol were also to be 
notified. Canadian army units were only to be 
used if VGC and RCMP personnel proved unable 
to control the situation.62  
 To coordinate a possible recapture operation, 
a temporary headquarters, commonly referred 
to as “Bleak House,” was established in a vacant 
building located about one kilometer away from 
Grande Ligne on the main road leading to the 
camp. The house also served as a temporary 
barrack for two well-armed VGC platoons and 
for four RCMP constables. As outlined in the 
operational orders: 
The first duty of these troops will be to assist 
the troops at the camp in preventing any actual 
escape, but the moment an escape occurs, or 
it appears probable that an attempt may be 
successful these men will take up previously 
assigned positions to protect the civilians in the 
neighborhood of the camp. There are twenty-five 
houses in the immediate vicinity of the camp. 
It is planned to place one Sten sub-machine 
gun equipped man in each house to remain on 
duty until relieved, or until instructed that the 
danger period has passed. They will be under 
the control of officers picked for this duty who 
will be working closely with the RCMP personnel 
also stationed at ‘Bleak House.’…In discussing 
the protection of civilians, consideration was 
given the danger of unduly alarming these 
people. It was decided that advance warning 
would not be advisable, but that all Army and 
RCMP personnel visiting the houses should be 
French-speaking. It is considered advisable to 
merely tell the householders that there have been 
some escapes and to volunteer to safeguard the 
houses – rather than to handle the approach in 
a manner that would greatly upset and alarm 
householders. Constant patrols by Army officers 
and RCMP personnel would then make sure that 
proper precautionary measures were in effect at 
each house.63 
 To ensure that the Canadians benefited 
from a proper communication system in case 
prisoners cut telephone lines, radio transmitting 
and receiving equipment was installed at Camp 
Grande Ligne, at ‘Bleak House,’ and at M.D.4 
headquarters. A First Aid station was also set up 
in the ‘Bleak House.’ In the meantime, the RCMP 
began preparing copies of photographs that had 
been taken of all prisoners upon their arrival in 
Canada for distribution to newspapers, bridge 
guards, and other civilian authorities to facilitate 
recapture.64 
 The HARIKARI Club scheme and the fears 
it generated had a considerable impact on the 
Canadian government’s refusal to accept a 
British request made in December 1944 that 
50,000 additional German POW be interned 
in Canada. Since D-Day, British and Canadian 
forces had captured German soldiers in the 
tens of thousands. The Canadians, for instance, 
detained more than 66,000 German POW in 
Northwest Europe alone by early December. 
This was an enormous number compared to 
the 34,000 German POW already being held in 
Canada.65  It appeared for this reason that Canada 
was not bearing its full share of the POW burden. 
At the time, the United Kingdom and the United 
States each detained more than 300,000 German 
POWs.66  London, therefore, hoped that Ottawa 
could help alleviate the POW accommodation 
problem in Northwest Europe. The Canadian 
War Cabinet refused the British request on 11 
December. Although the manpower crisis that 
prevailed in Canada and the introduction of 
conscription for overseas service in November 
1944 served as an excuse, the aggressive nature 
of the German POW in Canada, especially those at 
Grande Ligne, seemed to have had a much greater 
role to play in that decision.67  As Prime Minister 
William Lyon Mackenzie King wrote in his diary 
that same day: “Cabinet decided not to increase 
the number [of German POWs in Canada]…
because those we have are a real menace. We have 
not sufficient adequate protection for them and 
there is reason to believe they are forming suicide 
squads which may cause great trouble later on.”68  
Although Grande Ligne was the only internment 
facility in Canada where a suicidal mass escape 
was being planned, the threat still seemed serious 
enough to attract the Prime Minister’s attention. 
 On 30 December, an incident occurred 
which alarmed Canadian military authorities 
and confirmed the seriousness of the HARIKARI 
Club plot. The scare began when VGC guardsmen 
involved in a routine inspection of the POW living 
quarters found an anonymous letter addressed 
to the camp commandant warning him about 
the preparation of an “act of grave violence and 
destruction” by some of the camp’s inmates. 
Unaware that the camp staff already knew about 
the HARIKARI Club, the author of the note, 
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who probably was a ‘White’ prisoner, urgently 
requested the transfer of all German officers 
involved in the scheme. The letter provided the 
names of the most important and dangerous 
ones, which included Schemmel, Schnorr, and 
Moellerfriedrich.69  
 In light of these revelations, Canadian 
military officials became certain that HARIKARI 
Club members planned an escape at the earliest 
possible moment. On 3 January 1945, four 
RCMP intelligence officers arrived in the region. 
One of them was stationed in the camp while 
the others were assigned to ‘Bleak House.’70  The 
Directorate of Prisoners of War also informed 
the commandants of each Canadian POW camp 
about the situation at Grande Ligne. All were 
asked to keep a vigilant eye for the existence 
of schemes similar to the HARIKARI Club 
inside their respective camps.71  Tension rose 
on 6 January when a VGC guard accidentally 
discharged his rifle and put a bullet through an 
electric light conduit thereby creating a short in 
the wire and starting a fire in the recreation hut. 
Fortunately, the local fire department responded 
rapidly and was able to extinguish the flames 
without any serious damage. Surprisingly, none 
of the HARIKARI Club leaders took advantage of 
the incident to launch an escape.72  
 The 30 December scare made the Canadian 
government all the more determined to 
prevent additional German POW from being 
shipped to Canada for internment purposes. 
When the British authorities attempted on 16 
January 1945 to “re-open the question of the 
acceptance of further German POW by Canada,” 
Mackenzie King left the matter in the hands of 
the Minister of National Defence. Meeting with 
the British High Commissioner in Canada on two 
occasions, McNaughton explained “that there are 
insurmountable practical difficulties here” and 
that “for the time being at any rate, no further 
commitments in this matter should be assumed 
by the Canadian government.”73  Norman A. 
Robertson (Canada’s undersecretary of State 
for External Affairs), who had visited Camp 
Grande Ligne on 1 December 1944,74  reiterated 
McNaughton’s reasons in his official report to the 
British High Commission on 22 January: 
…no further commitments in this matter should 
be assumed by the Canadian government… 
General McNaughton said that he had to reckon 
on the possibility of serious trouble with the 
prisoners of war now in Canada. There is a good 
deal of evidence of plans amongst the prisoners 
to make demonstrations and to attempt mass 
escapes. Many of the prisoners are desperate 
and fanatical Nazis ready to cause trouble even 
though this in effect means their committing 
mass suicide. He is taking steps to reduce this 
danger…But in the meantime he cannot afford 
either to reduce the numbers of the guards or 
to lower the quality of the men employed as 
guards.75 
 The British government was deeply 
disappointed by the Canadian decision and, 
ultimately, few additional German POW were 
sent to Canada.76  Instead, Canadian military 
authorities concentrated their efforts on the re-
education and de-Nazification of those prisoners 
already in the country.77  
 HARIKARI Club members were finally 
transferred to the ‘Super Black’ POW Camp at 
Seebee in Alberta on 6 February 1945. In order 
not to agitate the prisoners and face a pre-
emptive HARIKARI Club attack, the move was 
kept secret. To instill an element of surprise, the 
operation was done in the early morning hours, 
when all inmates were asleep. The POWs selected 
to be transferred were immediately rounded up 
by armed guards and taken away along with 
their belongings. In the end, the Canadians faced 
no resistance whatsoever. Overall, some 236 
‘Black’ inmates were transferred. The camp was 
thoroughly searched that evening by RCMP and 
VGC personnel. The radio receiver and numerous 
evasion tools were found.78  The HARIKARI Club 
threat faded away as a result of the surprise 
transfer and the popularity of Nazism inside the 
camp drastically diminished in the following 
months. Subsequently, Grande Ligne became an 
internment center for ‘Grey’ prisoners of war. The 
unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany on 8 
May 1945 put the last nail in the coffin of Nazism 
in the camp. That summer, camp intelligence 
officers claimed that “confidence in the strength 
and sincerity of purpose of the western world (i.e. 
democracies)” had increased by 70 per cent.79  
Aside from a small strike organized by some of 
the remaining ‘Blacks’ to oppose the Canadian re-
education program in early August 1945, Nazism 
remained relatively dead inside the camp.80  
 Interestingly, a mass escape scheme similar 
to that of the HARIKARI Club was planned at 
Camp Seebee by several of the younger ‘Black’ 
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inmates transferred from Grande Ligne. Most of 
them used to be members of the HARIKARI Club. 
According to former inmate Otto Rietdorf, who 
claimed to have been quartermaster of escape 
tools at Grande Ligne, the Seebee group intended 
to escape and to operate as a commando or 
guerilla unit to demolish bridges and dams, cut 
telephone and power lines, and be as disruptive 
as possible in the region. Their goal was to 
instill panic in the civilian population and tie up 
large numbers of Canadian troops. These young 
activists’ plot was apparently dismantled by some 
of the older German officers.81 
 The HARIKARI Club mass escape scare of 
1944-1945 well demonstrated the degree of 
organization of German POW officers and how 
Nazism remained a powerful force in Canadian 
internment camps in the last months of the 
Second World War. Despite the introduction of 
the PHERUDA system of POW classification in 
early August 1944 and constant observation by 
camp censors and intelligence officers, Canadian 
military authorities proved unable to completely 
eradicate Nazi sympathies behind Canadian 
barbed wire. The development of the HARIKARI 
Club clearly showed the extent of this problem. 
The fact that ‘Black’ inmates were preparing a 
suicidal mass escape scheme which promised to 
wreak havoc on the Canadian home front took 
the Canadians by surprise. So intense became 
the HARIKARI Club affair that the Cabinet War 
Committee and the Prime Minister of Canada 
were even made aware of it. Had it not been 
for Georg Felber and Alois Frank, Canadian 
authorities might have never known about 
the existence of this plot. The discovery of the 
plot awakened great consternation and raised 
many questions. Why had military intelligence 
been unable to detect the existence of this Nazi 
organization sooner? Why Grande Ligne? Did 
similar suicidal plots exist in other Canadian 
internment camps? Measures adopted to counter 
the threat clearly illustrate the seriousness with 
which DND considered the issue. The arrival 
of additional troops, weapons, and supplies in 
Above: German prisoners gather around a piano at 
Camp Grande Ligne.  Right: Crew members of the 
German submarine U-35 at Camp Grande Ligne, 1944.
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the region, the strengthening of camp security 
arrangements, and the preparation of operational 
orders and precautionary plans reflected military 
officials’ fears. 
 The Grande Ligne situation also had a 
considerable impact on Canada’s internment 
operation. It showed the danger that ‘Black’ 
inmates constituted and the increasing necessity 
to incarcerate them in isolated regions. The 
decision to use Seebee in Alberta as a ‘Super Black’ 
camp served as a testimony to this new policy. 
The HARIKARI Club also played an important 
role in Ottawa’s refusal to incarcerate additional 
German POW in Canada. In summation, 
the HARIKARI Club scheme reflected the 
determination of German POW to remain loyal to 
Adolf Hitler and the Nazi regime despite military 
setbacks in Europe and the increasing realization 
that Germany would ultimately be defeated. 
It also showed the extent to which Canadian 
military authorities were determined to prevent 
potentially dangerous POW from disrupting 
home front activities. In the end, the HARIKARI 
Club affair demonstrated how vital intelligence 
and counter intelligence measures were in the 
administration of Canadian POW camps. 
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